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The
Battle of Fort Stephenson
The American Viewpoint
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Battle
Narratives
[Excerpted
from: Historical Collections of Ohio, by Henry Howe, published
in 1848, and Historical Narrative of the Civil and Military Services
of Major-General William Henry Harrison, by Moses Dawson, published
in 1824. The indented portions below are from Dawson's narrative.]
Description
of Lower Sandusky in 1848 (later re-named Fremont and sometimes referred
to in the text as just "Sandusky")
Lower Sandusky,
the county seat, is 24 miles southwesterly from Sandusky City, and 105
west of north from Columbus. The annexed engraving shows the town as
it appears from a hill northeast of it, on the opposite side of the river, near
the residence of Mr. Jasper Smith, seen in front. On the left, the bridge
across the Sandusky river partially appears; and a little to the right
of it, Whyler's hotel. On the hill are shown the court house, and the
Episcopal, Presbyterian and Catholic churches.
The town stands
at the head of navigation on the Sandusky, at the lower rapids, where
the Indians had a reservation of two miles square, granted to them by
the treaty of Greenville. It is said that at an early day the French
had a trading station at this point. Lower Sandusky contains 1 Episcopal,
1 Presbyterian, 1 Baptist, 1 Methodist and 1 Catholic church, 2 newspaper
printing offices, 8 grocery and 11 dry goods stores, 1 woollen factory,
1 foundery, and had, in 1840, 1117 inhabitants, and now has near 2000.
It is a thriving town, and considerable business is carried on. Its commerce
is increasing. Small steamers and sail vessels constantly ply from here.
There principal articles of export in 1846, were of wheat 90,000 bushels,
pork 560 barrels, ashes 558 casks, flour 1010 barrels, corn 18,400
bushels, staves 1,100,000: imports, 1480 barrels of salt and 250 tons
of merchandize.
Immediately
opposite Lower Sandusky, on the east bank of the river, is the small
village of Croghansville, laid out in 1817, which in a general description
would be included in the former.
Fort Stephenson,
or Sandusky, so gallantly defended by colonel Croghan on the 2d of August,
1813, against an overwhelming force of British and Indians, was within the present limits of Lower Sandusky. Its site is indicated by the
flag on the left in the engraving, which is about 30 rods southeast
of the court house, on high ground, much elevated above the river. The
fort enclosed about an acre of ground, and the picketing was in good
preservation as late as 1834. A private residence now stands within
the area. We annex a narration of the assault on the fort, from a published
source.
Having
raised the siege of Camp Meigs, the British sailed round into Sandusky
bay, while a competent number of their savage allies marched across
through the swamps of Portage river, to co-operate in a combined attack
on Lower Sandusky, expecting, no doubt, that General Harrison's attention
would be chiefly directed to Forts Winchester and Meigs. The general,
however, had calculated on their taking this course, and had been
careful to keep patroles down the bay, opposite the mouth of Portage,
where he supposed their forces would debark.
Several days before
the British had invested Fort Meigs, General Harrison, with Major
Croghan and some other officers, had examined the heights which surrounded
Fort Stephenson; and as the hill on the opposite or southeast side
of the river was found to be the most commanding eminence, the general
had some thoughts of removing the fort to that place, and Major Croghan
declared his readiness to undertake the work. But the general did
not authorize him to do it, as he believed that if the enemy intended
to invade our territory again, they would do it before the removal
could be completed. It was then finally concluded that the fort, which
was calculated for a garrison of only 200 men, could not be defended
against the heavy artillery of the enemy; and that if the British
should approach it by water, which would cause a presumption that
they had brought their heavy artillery, the fort must be abandoned
and burnt, provided a retreat could be effected with safety. In the
orders left with Major Croghan, it was stated-- " Should the British
troops approach you in force with cannon, and you can discover them
in time to effect a retreat, you will do so immediately, destroying
all the public stores."
"You must
be aware that the attempt to retreat in the face of an Indian force
would be vain. Against such an enemy your garrison would be safe,
however great the number."
On the evening
of the 29th, General Harrison received intelligence, by express, from
General Clay, that the enemy had abandoned the siege of Fort Meigs;
and as the Indians on that day had swarmed in the woods round his
camp, he entertained no doubt but that an immediate attack was intended
either on Sandusky or Seneca. He therefore immediately called a council
of war, consisting of M'Arthur, Cass, Ball, Paul, Wood, Hukill, Holmes
and Graham, who were unanimously of the opinion that Fort Stephenson
was untenable against heavy artillery, and that as the enemy could
bring with facility any quantity of battering cannon against it, by
which it must inevitably fall, and as it was an unimportant post,
containing nothing the loss of which would be felt by us, that the
garrison should therefore not be reinforced, but withdrawn, and the
place destroyed. In pursuance of this decision, the general immediately
dispatched the order to Major Croghan, directing him immediately to
abandoned Fort Stephenson, to set it on fire and repair with his command
to head quarters-- cross the river and come up on the opposite side,
and if he should find it impracticable to reach the general's quarters,
to take the road to Huron, and pursue it with the utmost circumspection
and dispatch. This order was sent by Mr. Conner and two Indians, who
lost their way in the dark, and did not reach Fort Stephenson till
11 o'clock the next day. When Major Croghan received, it he was of
opinion that he could not then retreat with safety, as the Indians
were hovering round the fort in considerable force. He called a council
of his officers, a majority of whom coincided with him in opinion
that a retreat would be unsafe, and that the post could be maintained
against the enemy, at least till further instructions could be received
from head quarters. The major therefore immediately returned the following
answer: "Sir, I have just received yours of yesterday, 10 o'clock,
P. M., ordering me to destroy this place and make good my retreat,
which was received too late to be carried into execution. We have
determined to maintain this place, and by heavens we can." In
the writing this note, Major Croghan had a view to the probability
of its falling into the hands of the enemy, and on that account made
use of stronger language than would otherwise have been consistent
with propriety. It reached the general on the same day, who did not
fully understand the circumstances and motives under which had been
dictated. The following order was there-fore immediately prepared,
and sent with Colonel Wells in the morning, escorted by Colonel Ball,
with his corps of dragoons.
"July
30, 1813.
"SIR--The
general has just received your letter of this date, informing him
that you had thought proper to disobey the order issued from this
office, and delivered to you this morning. It appears that the information
which dictated the order was incorrect; and as you did not receive
it in the night, as we expected, it might have been proper that you
should have reported the circumstance and your situation, before you
proceeded to its execution. This might have been passed over; but
I am directed to say to you, that an officer who presumes to aver
that he has made his resolution, and that he will act in direct opposition
to the orders of his general, can no longer be entrusted with a separate
command. Colonel Wells is sent to relieve you. You will deliver the
command to him, and repair with colonel Ball's squadron to this place.
By command, &c.
A.
H. HOLMES, Assistant Adjutant General."
Colonel Wells
being left in command of Fort Stephenson, Major Croghan returned with
the squadron to head-quarters. He there explained his motives for
writing such a note which were deemed satisfactory; and having remained
all night with the general, who treated him politely, he was permitted
to return to his command in the morning, with written orders similar
to those he had received before.
A reconnoitering
party which had been sent from head-quarters to the shore of the lake,
about 20 miles distant from Fort Stephenson, discovered the approach
of the enemy, by water, on the evening of the 31st of July. They returned
by the fort after 12 o'clock the next day, and had passed it but a
few hours, when the enemy made their appearance before it. The Indians
showed themselves first on the hill over the river, and were saluted
by a six-pounder, the only piece of artillery in the fort, which soon
caused them to retire. In half an hour the British gun-boats came
in sight, and the Indian forces displayed themselves in every direction,
with a view to intercept the garrison, should a retreat be attempted.
The six-pounder was fired a few times at the gun-boats, which was
returned by the artillery of the enemy. A landing of their troops
with a five and a half inch howitzer was effected about a mile below
the fort; and Major Chambers, accompanied by Dickson, was dispatched
towards the fort with a flag, and was met on the part of Major Croghan
by Ensign Shipp, of the 17th regiment. After the usual ceremonies Major
Chambers observed to Ensign Shipp that he was instructed by General
Proctor to demand the surrender of the fort, as he was anxious to
spare the effusion of human blood, which he could not do, should he
be under the necessity of reducing it, by the powerful force of artillery,
regulars and Indians under his command. Shipp replied, that the commandant
of the fort and its garrison were determined to defend it to the last
extremity; that no force however great could induce them to surrender,
as they resolved to maintain their post or to bury themselves in its
ruins. Dickson then said that their immense body of Indians could
not be restrained from murdering the whole garrison in case of success,
of which we have no doubt, rejoined Chambers, as we are amply prepared.
Dickson then proceeded to remark, that it was a great pity so fine
a young man should fall into the hands of the savages--Sir, for God's
sake, surrender, and prevent the dreadful massacre that will be caused
by your resistance. Mr. Shipp replied, that when the fort was taken,
there would be none to massacre. It will not be given up while a man
is able to resist. An Indian at this moment came out of an adjoining
ravine, and advancing to the ensign, took hold his sword and attempted
to wrest it from him. Dickson interfered, and having restrained the
Indian, affected great anxiety to get him safe into the fort.
The enemy now
opened their fire from their six-pounders in the gunboats and the
howitzer on shore, which they continued through the night with but
little intermission and with very little effect. The forces of the
enemy consisted of 500 regulars, and about 800 Indians commanded by
Dickson, the whole being commanded by General Proctor in person. Tecumseh
was stationed on the road to Fort Meigs with a body of 2000 Indians,
expecting to intercept a reinforcement on that route.
Major Croghan
through the evening occasionally fired his six-pounder, at the same
time changing its place occasionally to induce a belief that he had
more than one piece. As it produced very little execution on the enemy,
and he was desirous of saving his ammunition, he soon discontinued
his fire. The enemy had directed their fire against the northwestern
angle of the fort, which induced the commander to believe that an
attempt to storm his works would be make at that point. In the night,
Captain Hunter was directed to remove the six-pounder to a blockhouse,
from which it would rake that angle. By great industry and personal
exertion, Captain Hunter soon accomplished this object in secrecy.
The embrasure was masked, and the piece loaded with a half charge
of powder, and double charge of slugs and grape-shot. Early in the
morning of the 2d, the enemy opened their fire from their howitzer
and three six-pounders, which they had landed in the night, and planted
in a point of woods, about 250 yards from the fort. In the evening,
about 4 o'clock, they concentrated the fire of all their guns on their
northwest angle, which convinced Major Croghan that they would endeavor
to make a breach and storm the works at that point; he therefore immediately
had that place strengthened as much as possible with bags of flour
and sand, which were so effectual that the picketing in that place
sustained no material injury. Sergeant Weaver, with five or six gentlemen
of the Petersburgh volunteers and Pittsburgh blues, who happened to
be in the fort, was intrusted with the management of the six-pounder.
Late in the evening,
when the smoke of the firing had completely enveloped the fort, the
enemy proceeded to make the assault. Two feints were made towards
the southern angle, where Captain Hunter's lines were formed; and at
the same time a column of 350 men was discovered advancing through
the smoke, within 20 paces of the northwestern angle. A heavy galling
fire of musketry was now opened upon them from the fort, which threw
them into some confusion. Colonel Short, who headed the principal column,
soon rallied his men, and led them with great bravery to the brink
of the ditch. After a momentary pause he leaped into the ditch, calling
to his men to follow him, and in a few minutes it was full. The masked
porthole was now opened, and the six-pounder, at the distance of 30
feet, poured such destruction among them that but few who had entered
the ditch were fortunate enough to escape. A precipitate and confused
retreat was the immediate consequence, although some of the officers
attempted to rally their men. The other column, which was led by Colonel
Warburton and Major Chambers, was also routed in confusion by a destructive
fire from the line commanded by Captain Hunter. The whole of them
fled into the adjoining wood, beyond the reah of our fire-arms. During
the assault, which lasted half an hour, the enemy kept up an incessant
fire from their howitzer and five six-pounders. They left Colonel
Short, a lieutenant and twenty-five privates dead in the ditch; and
the total number of prisoners taken was twenty-six, most of them badly
wounded. "Col. Short, who commanded the regulars composing the
forlorn hope, was ordering his men to leap the ditch, cut down the
pickets, and give the Americans no quarters, when he fell mortally
wounded into the ditch, hoisted his white handkerchief on the end
of his sword, and begged for that mercy which he had a moment before
ordered to be denied to his enemy." Major Muir was knocked down
in the ditch, and lay among the dead till the darkness of the night
enabled him to escape in safety. The loss of the garrison was one
killed and seven slightly wounded. The total loss of the enemy could
not be less then 150 killed and wounded.
When night came
on, which was soon after the assault, the wounded in the ditch were
in a desperate situation. Complete relief could not be brought to
them by either side with any degree of safety. Major Croghan, however,
relieved them as much as possible--he contrived to convey them water
over the picketing in buckets, and a ditch was opened under the pickets,
through which those who were able and willing, were encouraged to
crawl into the fort. All who were able, preferred, of course, to follow
their defeated comrades, and many others were carried from the vicinity
of the fort by the Indians particularly their own killed and wounded;
and in the night, about 3 o'clock, the whole British and Indian force
commenced a disorderly retreat. So great was their precipitation that
they left a sail-boat containing some clothing and a considerable
quantity of military stores: and on the next day, seventy stand of
arms and some braces of pistols were picked up around the fort. Their
hurry and confusion were caused by the apprehension of an attack from
General Harrison, of whose position and force they had probably received
an exaggerated account.
It was the intention
of General Harrison, should the enemy succeed against Fort Stephenson,
or should they endeavor to turn his left and fall on Upper Sandusky,
to leave his camp at Seneca and fall back for the protection of that
place. But he discovered by the firing on the evening of the 1st, that
the enemy had nothing but light artillery, which could make no impression
on the fort; and he knew that an attempt to storm it without making
a breach, could be successfully repelled by the garrison; he therefore
determined to wait for the arrival of 250 mounted volunteers under
Colonel Rennick, being the advance of 700 who were approaching by
the way of Upper Sandusky, and then to march against the enemy and
raise the siege, if their force was not still too great for his. On
the 2d, he sent several scouts to ascertain their situation and force;
but the woods were so infested with Indians, that none of them could
proceed sufficiently near the fort to make the necessary discoveries.
In the night the messenger arrived at head-quarters with intelligence
that the enemy were preparing to retreat. About 9 o'clock, Major Croghan
had ascertained from their collecting about their boats, that they
were preparing to embark, and had immediately sent an express to the
commander-in-chief with this information. The general now determined
to wait no longer for the reinforcements, and immediately set out
with the dragoons, with which he reached the fort early in the morning,
having ordered Generals M'Arthur and Cass, who had arrived at Seneca
several days before, to follow him with all the disposable infantry
at that place, and which at this time was about 700 men, after the
numerous sick, and the force necessary to maintain the position, were
left behind. Finding that the enemy had fled entirely from the fort,
so as not to be reached by him, and learning that Tecumseh was somewhere
in the direction of Fort Meigs, with 2000 warriors, he immediately
ordered the infantry to fall back to Seneca, lest Tecumseh should
make an attack on that place, or intercept the small reinforcements
advancing from Ohio.
In his official
report of this affair, General Harrison observes that -- "It
will not be among the least of General Proctor's mortifications, that
he has been baffled by a youth, who has just passed his twenty-first
year. He is, however, a hero worthy of his gallant uncle, Gen. George
R. Clarke."
Captain Hunter,
of the 17th regiment, the second in command, conducted himself with
great propriety: and never was there a set of finer young fellows
than the subalterns, viz. :Lieutenants Johnson and Baylor of the 17th,
Meeks of the 7th, and Ensigns Shipp and Duncan of the 17th.
Lieutenant Anderson
of the 24th, was also noticed for his good conduct. Being without
a command, he solicited Major Croghan for a musket and a post to fight
at, which he did with the greatest bravery.
"Too much
praise" says Major Croghan, cannot be bestowed on the officers,
noncommissioned officers and privates under my command, for their gallantry
and good conduct during the siege."
The brevet rank
of lieutenant was immediately conferred on Major Croghan, by the
President of the United States, for his gallant conduct on this occasion.
The ladies of Chillicothe also presented him an elegant sword, accompanied
by a suitable address.
We take the above from Dawson's
Life of Harrison, where it is quoted from some other source. In defending
Gen. Harrison from the charges of cowardice and incompetency in not
marching to the aid of the garrison previous to the attack, Dawson says:
The conduct
of the gallant Croghan and his garrison received from every quarter
the plaudits of their countrymen. This was what they most richly deserved.
There was, however, some jealous spirits who took it into their heads
to be dissatisfied with the course pursued by the commanding general.
The order which was given to Colonel Croghan to evacuate and destroy
the garrison previously to the attack, was loudly condemned, as well
as the decision of the council of war, to fall back with the troops
then at Seneca, to a position twelve miles in the rear. Both these
measures, it has been said, were determined on by the unanimous advice
of the council of war. It is not to be presumed that such men as composed
that board, would have given advice which was in any way derogatory
to the honor of the American arms. Every individual among them either
had, before or afterwards, distinguished himself by acts of daring
courage and intrepidity. We do not profess to be much acquainted with
military matters, but the subject appears to us so plain as only to
require a small portion of common sense perfectly to comprehend it.
At the time that the determination was made to withdraw the garrison
from Sandusky, it must be recollected that the general had only with
him at Seneca about 400 infantry and 130 or 140 dragoons. The enemy,
as he was informed by General Clay in the letter brought by Captain
M'Cune, amounted to at least 5,000. With such a disparity of force,
would it have been proper to have risked an action to preserve the
post of Lower Sandusky, which of itself was of little or no importance,
and which, the garrison being withdrawn, contained nothing of any
value? The posts of Fort Meigs and Upper Sandusky were of the utmost
importance; the former was amply provided with the means of defence,
and was in no danger; but the latter, weak in its defences, and with
a feeble garrison, containing many thousands of barrels of flour and
other provisions, the sole resource of the army for the ensuing campaign,
was to be preserved at any risk. The position at Seneca was not in
the direct line from Fort Meigs to Upper Sandusky. The enemy, by taking
the direct route, would certainly reach it before General Harrison,
as several hours must have elapsed before he could have been informed
of their movement, even if it had been discovered the moment it had been
commenced, a circumstance not very likely to happen. It therefore
became necessary for the security of Upper Sandusky, that a position
better adapted to that purpose should be assumed. There was another
and most important reason for this movement: twelve miles in the rear
of Seneca, towards Upper Sandusky, the prairie or open country commences.
The infantry which the commander-in-chief had with him were raw recruits:
on the contrary, the squadron of dragoons were well disciplined, and
had seen much service. In the country about Seneca, this important
corps could have been of little service: in the open country to the
rear, they would have defeated five times their number of Indians.
It was for these reasons that it was determined by the council of
war, to change the position of the troops at Seneca. If this movement
did take place, the propriety of withdrawing the garrison of Lower
Sandusky was obvious. The place was extremely weak, and in a bad position.
It was not intended originally for a fort. Before the war it was used
as the United States' Indian factory, and had a small stockade around
it, merely for the purpose of keeping out drunken Indians. It was,
moreover, commanded by a hill, within point blank shot, on the opposite
side of the river. To those who supposed that General Harrison should
have advanced upon the enemy, the moment he discovered that Sandusky
was attacked, we must, in the language of the general and field officers
who were present on the occasion "leave them to correct their
opinions in the school of experience." General Harrison had been
reinforced a day or two before the siege of Sandusky, by the 28th
regiment, raised in Kentucky. After having received this corps, he
could not have marched more than 800 effective men without risking
his stores, and, what was of still more consequence, 150 sick at Seneca,
to be taken by the smallest party of Indians. The scouts of the army
brought information that the Indians were very numerous in the direction
of Fort Meigs. The general conjectured that a large portion of the
Indians were then ready to fall on his flank or rear, or the defenceless
camp at Seneca, should he advance. The information he received from
the British prisoners confirmed this opinion; a body of 2000 being
there under the command of Tecumseh. At the moment of which we are
speaking, the volunteers of Ohio were rapidly approaching. Now, under
these circumstances, does any reasonable man believe that General
Harrison should have advanced with his 800 raw recruits, against a
force in front which he knew to be so much superior in numbers, and
with the probability of having one equally large hanging on his flank?
What would have been thought of his abilities as a general, even if
he had been successful against General Proctor, (of which, with his
small force, there was little probability,) if in his absence Tecumseh,
with his 2000 warriors, had rushed upon Camp Seneca, destroyed his
stores, tomahawked his sick soldiers, and pursuing his route towards
Upper Sandusky, defeated the Ohio volunteers, scattered as they were
in small bodies, and finally ending his career with the destruction
of the grand magazine of his army, upon the preservation of which
all his hopes of future success depended? In all human probability
this would have been the result, had General Harrison advanced to
the relief of Fort Stephenson sooner than he did. It was certainly
better to risk for a while the defence of that fort to the talents
and valor of Croghan, and the gallant spirits who were with him, than
to jeopardize the whole prospects of the campaign.
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